an excerpt from my homework:
Here ε denotes the proportion of mutants with a better strategy – that is, one that will yield the Pareto-EES-u* payoff of (3,3). Consider, in turn, each possible matchings of these mutants in the population:
- σ* : σ. A σ*-playing sender meets an attractive receiving σ player at a bar. Still, σ* (sending m1 or m2 depending on type) is no worse than being a σ and sending m3.
- σ : σ*. A σ sender picks up a cute σ*. Back at the σ*'s place, σ says, ``So do you wanna m3?" The σ* receiver happily takes action C. Neither is worse off than if they'd both been σs.
- σ* : σ*. A σ* catches another σ*'s glance across the dance floor. The sender signals his type, and the receiver follows the appropriate σ* action. They end up with (3,3).